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Abstract
Since the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, the Republic of China (ROC) and the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) have maintained a complex relationship in which the PRC
claims that the ROC is a PRC province, even though the ROC has its own two-party democratic
system. The political separation of the ROC and the PRC is an exigent concern for the PRC, one
that the PRC has threatened using military force to resolve. This thesis examines the military and
political aspects of US involvement in the Asia Pacific during the Cold War, and how the United
States used its security relationship with the ROC to establish a hegemonic presence and deter
PRC aggressions against the ROC.
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Term Guide
PRC — People’s Republic of China
ROC — Republic of China
US — United States of America
PLA — People’s Liberation Army (the PRC military)
CPC — Communist Party of China (the PRC political party)
TRA — Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (outlines the US-ROC security relationship)
DPP — Democratic Progressive Party (the ROC pro-independence political party)
KMT — Kuomintang or Guomindang (the ROC nationalist political party)
UN — United Nations
China — Refers to the landmass of both Mainland China and Taiwan and the Chinese heritage
(traditional culture and traditions)
Mainland China — Refers to the landmass that has traditionally been known as China that the
PRC government currently controls
Taiwan — Refers to the island (previously known as Formosa) that the ROC government
currently controls
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Chapter One

Introduction
The Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) maintain a complex
relationship in which the PRC claims that the ROC is a PRC province, even though the ROC has
its own two-party democratic system.1 The political separation of the ROC and the PRC is an
exigent concern for the PRC, one that the PRC has threatened using military force to resolve;
however, the United States seeks a peaceful solution to the PRC-ROC situation.2
Due to the ROC’s complex relations with the PRC, the US-ROC security relationship has
been called into question. Why is the United States allied with the ROC? What is the US
military’s role in protecting the ROC? What has the PRC done in response to US involvement
with the ROC? This thesis seeks to examine how the United States initially utilized its
relationship with the ROC to contain communist influence in the Asia Pacific. I will primarily be
analyzing the military and political aspects of US involvement in the region during the Cold
War, such as refusing official recognition of the PRC and military protections of the ROC during
the Taiwan Strait Crises.
I hypothesize that the United States maintained a relationship with the ROC from the 1950s
through the 1980s in order to contain the developing power of communism in the Asia Pacific.
Because the United States acted like a hegemonic state in the region, it deterred PRC aggression
and facilitated a stabile Cross Strait environment. Although one of the initial reasons for

1

Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Dennis Van Vranken. Hickey. New Thinking about the Taiwan Issue: Theoretical
Insights into Its Origins, Dynamics, and Prospects. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012. Print.
2
Kan, Shirley A., and Wayne M. Morrison. "U.S.-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues." Federation of
American Scientists. N.p., 11 Sept. 2013. Web. 15 Sept. 2013.
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maintaining a relationship with the ROC was the containment of communism, the motivations
for this support have evolved over time.
The ROC is an important Asia Pacific ally for the United States because of its status as the
first East Asian democracy, the ability of the United States to check the PRC’s influence in the
Asia Pacific region, and the intelligence and military advantages the alliance with the ROC
provides to the United States. The significance of this thesis is to analyze the issues concerning
the US-PRC relationship during the Cold War and how it was influenced by the United States
defense of the ROC. In order to understand this relationship, one must first understand the
background between the United States, the ROC and the PRC.
The island of Taiwan was previously an Imperial Chinese province from 1683 until 1894,
after which it was ceded to the Empire of Japan from 1894 until 1945. At the end of World War
II, the Japanese surrendered Taiwan to the Kuomintang (KMT)-controlled Mainland China, the
previous ROC. On October 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung3 led the Communist Party of China (CPC) to
take control of Mainland China from the KMT. After the CPC takeover of the mainland, the
ROC government led by Chiang Kai-shek4 fled to Taiwan and seized control of the island. As a
result, the Chinese Civil War, which lasted from 1937 until 1949, divided China into two parts:
the PRC on Mainland China and the ROC on Taiwan.5
Despite the US presence in the region due to the occupation of Japan, the United States did
not interfere in the Chinese Civil War on behalf of the KMT. After the outbreak of the Korean

3

The first PRC Chairman and leader of the CPC during the Chinese Civil War
The ROC leader from 1928 to 1975
5
Clough, Ralph N. Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. Print.
4
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War, not only did communism seem more threatening, but the PRC itself became an adversary.
As a result, the United States began defending the ROC.6
The United States recognized the ROC as the Chinese state from 1949 until 1978; however,
in 1971, the PRC began representing China in the UN, and in 1978, the United States also
officially recognized the PRC, rather than the ROC, as the Chinese State. The United States thus
began its ambiguous policy of not officially recognizing the ROC, while simultaneously
protecting it from PRC aggression.
In 1992, the PRC and the ROC both agreed on a “One China” policy, which describes the
current status quo of cross strait relations. This policy states that both governments recognize
that there is only one China; however, the PRC and the ROC have different interpretations of this
policy. The PRC considers the ROC to be a rogue province, but still part of China. In contrast,
the ROC’s two political parties each have their own definitions of one China. The KMT
considers China to be one country with two systems: the ROC and the PRC. The Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) considers China to be the area under PRC control, and the ROC to be its
own country.
The PRC’s idea of the “One China” policy was portrayed by the CPC’s leader Jiang Zemin7
in the “8-Point Proposition” in 1995, which reiterated that the PRC and the ROC need to be
reunited because they are both still part of one China. The ROC’s KMT leader responded to this
proposition with the “Taiwan Communique No. 66”, and claimed that the PRC should recognize

6

Defending the ROC from the PRC threat was easy for the US military. The United States already had a military
presence in the region due to occupying Japan. Likewise, because Taiwan is a small island, it was easy to protect
with naval carriers.
7
PRC leader from 1993 until 2003
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that although there is one China, it has had two different governments since 1949 and that they
both should appreciate their shared Chinese culture.

Structure of Thesis
I begin this thesis with a review of literature that provides an introduction to scholarly
literature, Cross Strait issues, and my theoretical framework. This includes my hypothesis that
the United States utilized its involvement in the Asia Pacific to contain communism. I discuss
Hegemonic Stability Theory and assess the US hegemonic presence in the Asia Pacific.
Likewise, I introduce Deterrence Theory, which is how the United States has interacted with the
PRC in order to dissuade it from forcing reunification upon the ROC. In order to contain
communism in this region, the United States used its hegemonic presence as a tool to deter PRC
aggressions.
In the following chapter, I test my hypothesis that the United States utilized its relationship
with the ROC to contain the growth of communism in this region during the Cold War.
Likewise, the US hegemonic presence deterred PRC aggression and assisted in creating a stabile
Cross Strait region. As a result, the United States used its relationship with the ROC, hegemonic
presence, and deterrence of the PRC in order to contain communism in the Asia Pacific. This
chapter will be the core of my argument.
In my next chapter, I discuss potential future scenarios concerning US and PRC goals in the
Asia Pacific. I assess that the United States continues to provide protections to the ROC in order
to maintain its influential presence in the region, and that the United States achieves this through
its support of the ROC democracy and US arms sales to the ROC. Likewise, I predict that the
PRC desires to become the Asia Pacific hegemon. Because this chapter assesses the future
9

stability of the Asia Pacific, these scenarios cannot be tested; however, they are important to take
into account due to future stability in the region.
My final chapter is a conclusion chapter. It finishes this thesis with a series of deductions
that come from both my research and analysis, including why the ROC has strategic value for the
United States, and recommends policy concerning the future in the Asia Pacific region.
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Chapter Two

Literature Review
In this chapter, I will review existing scholarly literature and theory pertaining to how the
United States worked to contain Chinese communism during the Cold War. This section is
structured into two parts that discuss hegemons and deterrence, which are both tools that the
United States used to contain communism.

Hegemony
What are the United States and PRC intentions in the Asia Pacific region? I hypothesize that
the US hegemonic presence stabilized the region during the end of the twentieth century and
assisted in containing communist influence. Likewise, the US hegemonic presence deterred PRC
aggression during this time, an issue that will be discussed in the second part of this chapter.
The United States has been considered to be the world’s preponderant power, resulting in the
ability to influence numerous regions of the world, including the Asia Pacific. After World War
II, Japan lost its position as the Asia Pacific hegemon. Because the United States maintained its
military presence in the Asia Pacific, it not only supplanted Japan as the regional hegemon, but
prevented other East Asian powers from becoming the hegemonic state.
According to the Hegemonic Stability Theory, the hegemon is the main beneficiary and also
the primary provider of externalities to other states.8 Mearsheimer claims that regional hegemons
go to great lengths to stop other great powers from becoming hegemons in their region of the

8

Brilmayer, Lea. “American Hegemony: Political Mortality in A One-Superpower World.” Yale University Press.
(1994). Pg. 18
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world; likewise, he claims that the United States operates according to this logic.9 In regards to
the Asia Pacific region, as long as the United States remains a powerful presence, it prevents the
PRC from expanding its own influence.
In order for the United States to become the regional hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, it
had to expel the influence of other great powers from the region while also expanding its own
influence. According to Mearsheimer, for the 115 years after its 1783 independence, the United
States pursued regional hegemony through an expansionist policy referred to as “Manifest
Destiny.” In addition, United States leaders also enforced the “Monroe Doctrine” in order to
expel European powers from the Americas.10 Due to past trends, the United States also prevented
the PRC from becoming the regional hegemon by containing its territorial growth. Without US
influence, the PRC could have already become the regional hegemon, which would have
ultimately resulted in the United States being pushed out of this region.
The United States initially did not intend to influence Chinese affairs, which is shown during
the Chinese Civil War when Truman reiterated,
“The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges, or to
establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of
utilizing its Armed Forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States
Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil
conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide
military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.”11

Because communism became a threat to the United States and its allies in the Asia Pacific
region, the United States changed its stance and became directly involved in the Korean War. As
9

Mearsheimer, John J. "Taiwan's Dire Straits." National Interest 130 (2014): 29. MasterFILE Premier., Pg. 33
Mearsheimer, John J. “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia.” Chinese Journal of
International Politics (2010).
11
Truman, Harry S. “Statement On Formosa”, 5 January, 1950
10
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a result, the PRC was prevented from forcing reunification upon the ROC due to the beginning
of US military protections to the ROC.
In his article, Zhongqi makes a point that the United States has an ambiguous policy towards
the Cross Strait situation. Although the United States does not recognize the ROC as its own
state, it provides military protections and sells weapons to the ROC. Zhongqi claims that the
United States favors ROC independence and shows this through weapons sales to the ROC.12
Zhongqi also says that preventing reunification is the primary reason that the United States
established this relationship with the ROC;13 however, he does not acknowledge that the United
States continues weapons sells in order to uphold the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), maintain the
alliance with the ROC, and lobbying efforts from defense contractors. Another factor that
Zhongqi failed to take into account is United States’ own incentives. For example, according to
Cohen, the United States considered the ROC to be critical in the struggle against the spread of
communism during the Cold War. By establishing this relationship, the United States prevented
the PRC from forcing communist ideology onto the ROC.14 Likewise, Zhao also showed that one
of the motivations for the United States to maintain this relationship with the ROC results from
the PRC’s emergence as a world super power and a desire to be able to contain this power.15
Another motivation for the United States containing the PRC was due to the potential loss of
intelligence capabilities and a military presence in the region. Mearsheimer claims that the PRC

12

Zhongqi, Pan. "US Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: A Dilemma of Deterrence." Journal of Contemporary
China 12.35 (2003): 387-407. Web.
13
Zhongqi, Pan. "US Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: A Dilemma of Deterrence." Journal of Contemporary
China 12.35 (2003). Web.
14
Cohen, Warren I. America's Response to China: a History of Sino-American Relations, 5th ed, New York:
Columbia UP (2010), 191-205.
15
Zhao, Suisheng. China-U.S. Relations Transformed: Perspectives and Strategic Interactions. London: Routledge,
2008. Print.
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would prefer the removal of the US presence in the Asia Pacific, and replace the United States as
the hegemonic presence. This is portrayed when he says, “the PRC will try to dominate Asia the
way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere, which means it will seek to reduce, if
not eliminate, the American military presence in Asia.”16 As a result, the United States has
incentives to maintain its relationship with the ROC because it can assist in balancing power in
this region in multiple ways. First, Mearsheimer claims that the ROC’s location would be a
strategic base if conflict erupted in the South China Seas. Second, he claims that the US
commitment to the ROC gives it credibility in the region. By maintaining this alliance, the
United States shows its other East Asian allies that it will protect its allies in this region.17
Mearsheimer also notes that the United States could forsake its relationship with the ROC in
order to prevent a Sino-American war because of the possibility that it could escalate to nuclear
levels.18 Although the relationship with the ROC assists in securing the US presence in East
Asia, Mearsheimer claims that the United States would forsake this presence if tensions escalated
to a possible Sino-American war.
Although Mearsheimer makes several valid points, such as maintaining this relationship
because the ROC’s location is strategically close to the PRC, showing other East Asian allies that
the United States will uphold its promises, and also preventing a conflict between nuclear powers
all influence this relationship, he does not acknowledge that the United States could likely be
continuing this relationship with the ROC in order to contain the PRC’s influence in the region.
Likewise, he does not address that it is the US hegemonic presence that maintained a stabile
Cross Strait region during the end of the 20th century, due to its deterrence of PRC aggression.
16

Mearsheimer, John J. "Taiwan's Dire Straits." National Interest 130 (2014): 29. MasterFILE Premier., Pg.29
Mearsheimer, John J. "Taiwan's Dire Straits." National Interest 130 (2014): 29. MasterFILE Premier., Pg.34
18
Mearsheimer, John J. "Taiwan's Dire Straits." National Interest 130 (2014): 29. MasterFILE Premier., Pg.35
17
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Bernkopf discusses the potential threat that the PRC could be for the United States if it
reunified with the ROC. At the beginning of her research, she addresses the possibility of a nonmilitary reunification between the PRC and the ROC due to the ROC’s economic reliance on the
PRC.19 Despite this, Bernkopf also claims that,
“After more than a decade of political and social transformation, the ROC public
increasingly perceives itself as something other than simply Chinese…On the
island, as on the mainland, shifts in attitudes, generations, and historical
circumstances created a new ROC nationalism – a potent force for local unity
based on a Taiwan identity…Once celebrated equally on both sides of the strait,
the idea of one China no longer commands unquestioned agreement in the
ROC.”20

As one may convey from this excerpt, willing reunification has become less likely over
time due to the ROC populace developing a non-Chinese nationalism by establishing a new
identity that is Taiwanese.
If the ROC did peacefully reunite with the PRC, how would this impact the US security
presence in Asia? Bernkopf answers this question by saying, “Anything that helps the PRC grow
stronger, including unification with the ROC, would not be in US interests.”21 Likewise,
Berknopf addresses the PRC’s discontent with the United States when she says, “the alleged
threat advanced by the “rise” of the PRC grows out of the PRC’s anti-Americanism and yearning
for regional hegemony”.22 The PRC has a desire be a stronger presence in the Asia Pacific;
however, the US-ROC alliance prevents this from happening because the United States continues
19

Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 16
20
Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 17-18
21
Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 23
22
Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 20
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to maintain a hegemonic presence in the region. This is shown when she writes, “Beijing
unsurprisingly sees evidence everywhere that Washington has been maneuvering to keep Taiwan
separate from the PRC,” and that the United States has particularly achieved this through
military support of the ROC.23 As a result, in recent years, the PRC considers the United States
to be containing its own growing influence through the US-ROC relationship.
According to Bernkopf, one of the reasons that the United States should not support
Cross Strait reunification is that, “A strong and assertive PRC, even if democratic, would
complicate Washington’s diplomatic and security calculations, impinging on its position and
alliances in East Asia.”24 In regards to the geostrategic implications of the situation, this could
impact US-Japanese relations. Bernkopf claims that Japan’s fears of the PRC attacking the ROC
and impacting Japan due to its proximity to the ROC would be relieved. This could result in
alleviating tensions between Japan and the PRC, and potentially Japan becoming less tolerant of
US bases on its soil.25
Bernkopf claimed that a PRC-ROC reunification would also result in a strategic loss of
intelligence capabilities for the United States. After the United States recognized the PRC in
1979, it stopped using the ROC as a base for aerial reconnaissance; however, it did not end other
collection programs conducted from the ROC, such as extensive listening posts and human
intelligence operations.26 As a result, if the PRC reunited with the ROC, these programs would

23

Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 19
24
Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 20
25
Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 22
26
Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 23
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end and handicap the US intelligence process and defense efforts by obstructing information
gathering.
The PRC’s recovery of the ROC could result in the PLA projecting its naval and air power
beyond the coastal waters, and might be tempted to contest the US military presence in the
region and strive for greater force projection capabilities.27 The United States has acted in such a
way to prevent this from occurring because by obtaining the ROC, the PRC could cause further
instability in the South China Seas region. For example, by unifying with the ROC, the PRC
would also gain greater proximity to the Senkaku-Diaoyu islands,28 which could threaten
stability in the region.
One has to ask why each involved actor in the Cross Strait tensions — the PRC, the
ROC, and the United States — have not allowed for this issue to reach a final outcome?
According to Ross, the PRC has three sets of interests in the ROC which encourage the PRC to
maintain its influence over the ROC. These interests are security, nationalism and domestic
politics.29
In regards to security, if the ROC became independent and another power established a
military presence on the ROC, this could be a security threat to the PRC due to its close
proximity to the island. For example, the United States could likely reestablish its previous

27

Bernkopf Tucker, Nancy. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should The United States Care?." Washington
Quarterly 25.3 (2002): 15-28. Political Science Complete. Web. Pg. 21
28
These are uninhabited islands that are part of a territorial dispute between the PRC, the ROC, and Japan. The
islands are 170 kilometers from the closest Taiwanese and Japanese islands and are 330 km from the PRC. By
reuniting with the ROC, the PRC would have a stronger claim over the territory. Currently, the ROC does not
participate in the dispute as much as the other two regions due to their superior militaries.
29
Ross, Robert S. "The Stability Of Deterrence In The Taiwan Strait." National Interest 65 (2001): 67. MasterFILE
Premier. Web. 5 Dec. 2015. Pg. 70
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military outposts in the ROC. Likewise, intelligence outposts could be utilized against the PRC
due to the ROC’s proximity to Mainland China.
Ideological values such as nationalism encourage the populace to support the government;
likewise, the issue of nationalism is important to the PRC. If there was a PRC-ROC
reunification, the ROC people would need to identify as Chinese, rather than Taiwanese, to assist
in maintaining a stable relationship between the two regions. Recently, a movement of
Taiwanese nationalism has become widespread in the ROC, and even resulted in protests, such
as the “Sunflower Movement”.30
The issue of nationalism leads to the third reason — domestic politics.31 Because the ROC
populace has begun identifying as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, there has been more support
for the pro-independence ROC political party, the DPP, which is indicated through the recent
election of the DPP president. As a result, the ROC political system challenges PRC sovereignty
and creates more friction between the two regions.
Mearsheimer and Bernkopf claimed that the PRC desires to expand its influence over the
Asia Pacific, and if this occurs, the PRC would expel the United States from this region. I agree
with this claim because states that seek or gain regional hegemony seek to prevent states of equal
or greater power from having influence in this region. Unlike the authors’ opinions, I also assess
that the United States acted as the regional hegemon in the Asia Pacific during the end of the
20th century, which according the Hegemonic Stability Theory, resulted in the US hegemonic
influence creating a stabile Asia Pacific region and deterred PRC aggression towards the ROC.
30

This was a 2014 student protest in the ROC. Students protested the ROC’s increased relations with the PRC, using
slogans such as “the ROC is not part of China” （台灣不是中國的一部分） and “the ROC is an independent
country” （台灣是獨立的國家）
31
Because the PRC considers the ROC to be a PRC province, ROC-PRC relations are defined as domestic politics
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Without the US hegemonic presence, the PRC likely would have been the regional hegemon,
making the region more vulnerable to communist influence. Deterrence and hegemony go hand
in hand in containing the CPC during the Cold War.

Deterrence
I theorize that the United States maintained its relationship with the ROC in order to contain
PRC growth. The PRC aggression towards the ROC caused instability in the region; however,
the United States deterred the PRC through its hegemonic presence, which it retained due to its
security relationship with the ROC. As a result, hegemony and deterrence were both used as
tools to contain communism.
The United States succeeded in deterring PRC influence over the ROC through the threat of
the US hegemonic influence in the region and US military superiority, a situation that can be
defined by deterrence theory. Deterrence theory is one of the most notable theoretical
accomplishments of international studies.32

Deterrence refers to a situation in which one side

threatens to retaliate if the other side takes an action that it considers unacceptable.33 This
implies that the purpose of deterrence is using a threat to prevent one side from doing something.
Essentially, it is a method that one side uses to prevent an aggressor from attaining unfavorable
foreign policy goals by convincing the aggressor that by doing so, the costs will exceed the value
of the initial objective of the aggressor.
“Challengers to the status quo want to avoid military escalation when major
powers are expected to intervene in support of their adversaries, and defending
states seek outside support to counter threats to their security. Miscalculation by
either side can have far-reaching security consequences. State leaders may
32
33

Zhang, Shu Guang. Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, p 2.
Danilovic, Vesna. “Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence”. 2001
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engage their country in military hostilities with a stronger military coalition if
they underestimate the likelihood of intervention by major powers. Conversely,
policymakers from defending states may stand firm in crisis negotiations only to
find that, at the brink of war, a major power does not come to their defense as
expected.” 34

Aggressors want to avoid military escalation when major powers provide military support
to the aggressor’s adversaries due to the potential high costs of attack. Likewise, the adversary of
the aggressor also needs to be cautious due to the possibility that the major power will not
provide assistance.
Huth addresses four situations in which states pursue deterrence. These result from
combining two dimensions of deterrence policies. These dimensions include deterrence being
directed at preventing an armed attack against a country’s own territory (direct deterrence) or
that of another country (extended deterrence). Likewise, countries may use deterrent threats in
response to a short-term threat of attack (immediate deterrence) or to prevent a short-term
conflict and a militarized conflict from occurring (general deterrence). After combining these
two dimensions, the four situations which result are a) direct-immediate deterrence, b) directgeneral deterrence, c) extended-immediate deterrence, and d) extended-general deterrence.35 In
regards to the Cross Strait conflict, US security protections provided to the ROC are an
extended-general deterrence, because they had short-term goals and also prevented a militarized
conflict from occurring between the PRC and the ROC.
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Even if deterrence results in the prevention of a war or crisis, it does not mean the
deterrence succeeded. In regards to future conflict, the aggressor could still remain a potential
threat. Huth addresses this issue and says,
“Complete success would entail potential attackers backing away from threats of
escalation without resorting to any use of force and without securing any
demanded changes to the status quo. Complete failure would involve escalation
by the attacker, including large-scale attack, or capitulation by the defender to the
attacker’s maximum demands as the price for avoiding limited uses of force and
defending states offering concessions only on issues of secondary interest to the
attacker.”36

Although the aggressor might not immediately attack its adversary, the potential for future
conflict remains unless the aggressor completely backs away from the situation. In the case of
the ROC and the PRC, US deterrence has been successful in the short run; however, the potential
for conflict still remains due to the PRC’s desire to reunite with the ROC and its unwillingness to
allow the ROC to be internationally recognized as its own state.
Danilovic identifies four outcomes of deterrence - challenger’s acquiescence, defender’s
acquiescence, compromise, and war. Three of these are peaceful outcomes; however, they result
in different political implications for both sides. This expanded view of outcomes reveals two
forms- one violent and one peaceful-of potential failures; likewise, it includes compromise,
which involves gains and losses to both sides. The last issue involves how states can initiate
conflict due to their opponent’s behavior.37 Having more potential outcomes besides success and
failure reveals that the prevention of war escalation does not guarantee a success; likewise,
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compromise is a more likely to occur when a third party power is involved. The ROC and PRC
tensions since the 1950s have continued in a state of high tensions; however, because of the US
stabilizing presence, these tensions did not escalate due to the potential costs.
Ross describes the superiority of US military capabilities in comparison to the PLA, which
assists in deterring PRC aggression. Although the PRC has recently developed its military
capabilities, the United States “can inflict a rapid and punishing attack against the PRC forces
while emerging from war with minimal casualties”.38 As a result, war with the United States
would be detrimental to the PRC. By losing in a conflict to the United States, the PRC would be
weakened and no longer be one of the strongest actors in East Asia.
The United States is not the only state that uses deterrence in the region. Ross claims that the
reason the ROC has not moved towards independence is because of PRC deterrence. PRC
military capabilities exceed the ROC’s, and an attack against the ROC could negatively impact
the ROC’s political status quo. The ROC’s democracy is “young and fragile”, and as a result, it
is unclear whether “the ROC’s democracy could long survive intensified PRC-ROC conflict”.39
Even if the United States provides protections to the ROC, Ross claims that the political structure
in the ROC could “nonetheless lose all that is work defending”.40 As a result, even though the
PRC is deterred from initiating conflict, the ROC is also deterred from declaring independence,
which could cause conflict initiation.
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Ross claims that the United States does not have vital security or political interests in regard
to the ROC and the PRC issue and does not care about the solution as long as it is a peaceful
one;41 however, he also reports that the United States should undergo a few measures in order to
ensure that it maintains the current East Asian status quo. First, the United States must continue
to act as a deterrent to the PRC by using force to protect the ROC.42 By doing so, the PRC
would be unwilling to attack the ROC and cause instability in the region. Second, the United
States should remain ambiguous in the cross strait situation.43 As a result, the United States
continues to support the ROC’s self-defense in order to preserve its sovereignty, but opposes a
ROC declaration of independence, which pacifies the PRC. Likewise, according to Ross, the
United States should not oversell arms to the ROC.44 This could result in increased tensions with
the PRC, because the PRC could think the United States supports the ROC’s independence.
Likewise, it is the US military and not the ROC’s that acts as a deterrent to the PRC.
Chan discusses the possibility of the United States acting as a deterrent to the PRC by
claiming that, “there is little doubt that it (the United States) wishes to forestall a PRC invasion
of this island and, as such, represents a case of extended deterrence”.45 As one may see from the
excerpt, Chan also concludes that US involvement in Cross Strait issues results in intentional
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deterrence in order to insure “regional peace and stability”46 and also ROC's autonomy and
human rights issues in the PRC.47
Chan does not discuss other motivations for the United States protecting the ROC, and
instead focuses on causes of the tensions. For example, he reports that the ROC and the PRC are
reluctant to disclose private information to one another, because the other side could use it
against them.48 This influences commitment problems between the two regions because they
cannot trust one another to uphold a treaty if one was created.49 As a result, the ROC and the
PRC have been unable to create a treaty acceptable for both sides.
Chan also claims that although the challenger (the PRC) expects a major setback on the
battlefield (such as US intervention), it could still launch an attack. “One can lose on the
battlefield and still “win” in the sense of forcing the other side to rethink the probability of its
success”.50 As a result, Chan portrays conflict as a sense of negotiation. Because the ROC and
the PRC have not had conflict in many years and are now being deterred from fighting, this
negotiation has not continued.
Ross and Chan both claimed that the United States acts as a deterrent to the PRC, a situation
that I agree with; however, Ross claims that the United States’ only motivations for this
deterrence is due to wanting to prevent military actions of the PRC against the ROC. Likewise,
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Chan also does not list the motivations of US deterrence to the PRC. Although the United States
might have had several motivations for maintaining a presence in this region, one of these is
containing PRC influence. Through acting as a stabilizing hegemon in the region and
maintaining its relationship with the ROC, the United States succeeds in deterring PRC
aggressions, and as a result, containing the CPC.
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Chapter Three

Test: The US Containment of Communism
After World War II, the United States strived militarily, economically, and diplomatically to
counter communist influence, specifically that of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The
United States achieved this through creating a military presence in regions vulnerable to
communist influence. The United States prevented the PRC from attacking the ROC; however,
this tactic did not succeed in all cases, such as in Vietnam. Because of the increase of
communism’s influence during the Cold War and the Korean War, the United States utilized its
relationship with the ROC to contain the spread of communism’s growing influence.
What has been the extent of US influence in the Asia Pacific region? This explorative study
addresses reason for US continued presence in the region after the end of War World II.
Initially, the reason for the US presence in the region was due to the occupation of Japan;
however, the reason changed after the outbreak of the Korean War when the spread of
communism threatened the Asia Pacific. By acting as a hegemonic presence, the United States
had a stabilizing effect on the region and was able to deter CPC influence; however, this effect
diminished as a deterrent to the PRC since the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises, which
resulted in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis.
Initially, the United States did not intend to drastically influence the Asia Pacific and focused
on affairs with the Soviet Union since that was the primary threat of the time. For example,
during the Chinese Civil War, the United States did not support the KMT against the CPC;
likewise, after the KMT fled to the ROC, President Truman decided that the United States would
not be involved in the conflict. In January 1950, Truman announced that “the United States
Government will not provide military aid or advice to the PRC forces or the ROC. The United
26

States has no intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in present conflict in China.”51
The United States did not intend to defend the KMT from defeat by the CPC, and distanced itself
from Chinese domestic affairs during the Chinese Civil War.
Truman’s stance on the PRC-ROC conflict changed later that year due to the outbreak of the
Korean War and the desire to contain the spread of communism. In response to PRC military
support of North Korea, the United States intervened in the Korean War on behalf of the ROC
and South Korea by sending its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait.
The outbreak of the Korean War resulted in communism not only becoming recognized by
the United States as a threat to democracy, but the PRC becoming an US adversary. The Korean
War facilitated the security relationship between the United States and the ROC, and initiated the
US containment of communist influence in the Asia Pacific. Likewise, since the Korean War,
the United States acted to contain the PRC’s influence in order to prevent the spread of
communism.
The United States justified its involvement during the Korean War due to the “Domino
Theory”, which claimed that if one country in a region became communist, then the other
countries in the region would follow. Eisenhower described this theory when he claimed,
“Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call
the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock
over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will
go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that
would have the most profound influences.”52
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Although the United States was already occupying Japan after World War II, the Domino
Theory further motivated the United States involvement in the region in order to contain the
spread of communism. The Korean War would later influence US relations with other states in
the region that were vulnerable to communist influence.
In addition to participation in the Korean War, the United States also exercised similar
involvement during the Vietnam War. By deploying troops and supplies to support the South
Vietnamese government, the United States participated in extended deterrence in order to contain
communism. During the Vietnam War, the United States actively opposed the spread of
communism and the Soviet supported North Vietnamese government. This opposition to
communism in the Asia Pacific, such as in places like Vietnam and the Korean Peninsula, is
shown when Truman addressed the outbreak of the Korean War and said,
“The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has
passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now
use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the
United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these
circumstances the occupation of Formosa (the ROC) by Communist forces would
be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces
performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. Accordingly I have
ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa….The determination of
the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a
peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”53

Truman makes it clear that he considers the growth of communism to be a threat to the
United States and its allies in the Asia Pacific. He addresses the issue once more after the start of
the Korean War when he said,
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“This attack has made it clear, beyond all doubt, that the international Communist
movement is willing to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. An
act of aggression such as this creates a very real danger to the security of all free
nations.”54

The Korean War and the Vietnam War demonstrate the US containment policy of
communism not only towards the Soviet Union, but other states in the region as well. In regards
to the PRC, the United States utilized its relationship with the ROC in order to contain the CPC’s
influence.
Although the other members of the United Nations began recognizing the PRC in 1972,
the United States continued to refuse to have formal relations with this communist state. In an
attempt to contain communism, then United States obstinately continued to official relations with
the ROC rather than the PRC. It was not until 1971 that President Nixon finally visited the PRC
and set the precedent for the “Shanghai Communiqué” of 1972. This communiqué normalized
relations between the United States and the PRC in order to reduce international tensions.
Despite the normalization of Sino-American relations, the “Shanghai Communiqué” did not
clarify the status of the nationalists and the ROC, and the United States continued official
recognition of the ROC.
Through the “Shanghai Communiqué”, the PRC reiterated that it is the only legal Chinese
government and the ROC is merely a rogue province. The United States acknowledged that
“there is one China and the ROC is part of China”; however, the United States also wants the
PRC-ROC issue to be settled peacefully.55 As a result, even though the United States finally
agreed to begin relations with the PRC, it refused to acknowledge its sovereignty over the ROC.
54
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Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger addresses the United States motives for the
“Shanghai Communiqué” and claims that it not only is to prevent Soviet influence,56 but also
discourage forceful reunification between the ROC and the PRC.57
In 1979, the United States and the PRC finally formalized diplomatic relations through
the “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations”. As a result, the United
States also agreed to end formal state relations with the ROC and to remove the US military
presence from the island. Despite this development, the US official position regarding the ROC
remained ambiguous; however, the ROC became an important ally in regards to US anticommunist ideology.58
Although the United States agreed to remove its military from the ROC, it also made
another agreement with the ROC, the “Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979”, which is
considered to be the primary security of the United States to the ROC. This act maintains peace
in the Asia Pacific region by protecting the ROC from military threats, specifically those from
the PRC. According to the TRA, “any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
peaceful means is a threat to the peace and stability of the Western Pacific area and is of grave
concern to the United States”.59
The TRA’s security protections to the ROC ensured that United States would maintain
influence in the region. Likewise, the TRA shows US determination to continue protections of
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the ROC against PRC aggression, and also prevent the spread of communism to the ROC.
Kuntić describes the TRA as a method to contain communism when he claims,
“The ROC became a deflector shield against “red China” and communism in
general….the ROC remained deeply integrated in the US sphere of
influence….the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act that would
demonstrate US determination to continue military support to its informal ally
(the ROC). ”60

Pak Nung and Yue Wai further discuss the reasons for maintaining support for the ROC
when they claim, “Since WWII, US national security policy has been consistent in implementing
the containment policy.”61 By increasing the US presence in the Asia Pacific, the United States
achieved in containing the PRC’s influence.
The United States began further participating in extended deterrence through arms sales
in 1982 with the United States and the PRC agreeing upon the “Joint Communiqué on Arms
Sales to Taiwan between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China”.
This communiqué was intended to end US arms sales with the ROC and stated that the United
States “does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to the ROC, arms sales to the
ROC will not exceed previous levels supplied, and it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms
to the ROC.”62 However, the Reagan administration ensured that there was a loophole — no
deadline of arms sales. The Reagan administration sent a presidential letter to the ROC that
consisted of six points that outline US-ROC relations. Because of these “Six Assurances”
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(1982)63 between the United States and the ROC, the United States avoided putting a time limit
to arms sales with the ROC, and the United States has been able to provide arms to the ROC
during the entirety of its separation from the PRC by primarily selling defensive weapons to the
ROC rather than offensive ones.64 By doing so, the United States simultaneously upheld the
TRA, which emphasizes that weapons sales to the ROC should be defensive rather than
offensive, while also insuring that the PRC does not attack the ROC and expand its influence.
The two communiqués between the United States and the PRC recognized the PRC as the
legitimate Chinese government; however, the TRA and the “Six Assurances” are defense pacts
that guarantee US security protections to the ROC. Defense pacts are essential parts of extended
deterrence and can be described when Johnson writes,
“Defense pacts include an explicit extended general deterrence threat. Potential
challengers are placed on notice: Under specified circumstances, if a member
state is attacked, her ally will join the conflict to defend her, and the potential
challenger should thus expect to fight the ally also in a multilateral conflict.”65

This quote describes the United States protections of the ROC during the Cold War and
how it utilized this relationship to contain the growth of communism in the Asia Pacific during
the post-World War II society through its deterrence of the PRC. By refusing to acknowledge
the PRC’s government, the United States undermined PRC sovereignty in the region. Likewise,
the United States also contained the growth of communism through extended deterrence of the
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PRC. On one hand, the United States formally recognized the PRC and acknowledged that the
ROC is not an independent state, while simultaneously guaranteeing security protections to the
ROC and its intentions to defend it against forced reunification with the PRC. On the other
hand, the United States actively protected the ROC from the PRC during the three Taiwan Strait
Crises, which will be discussed in the next section of this thesis. The TRA states that the United
States will continue arms sales and military cooperation with the ROC, which indicates that the
United States desires to maintain its presence in the region. Likewise, this hegemonic presence
also results in the containment of the PRC’s influence, and by extension, the containment of
communism.
The US hegemonic presence in Asia Pacific region resulted in the ability to deter the
PRC from a ROC attack. As a result, according to Hegemonic Stability Theory, the US
hegemonic presence during this time, the Cross Strait region remained without conflict during
the time between the Second and Third Taiwan Strait Crises. The US presence deterred PRC
aggression and the PRC instead focused on internal rather than external security; however, in the
1990s, the PRC became discontent with US hegemony, resulting in the Third Taiwan Strait
Crisis.
Although the United States initially occupied Japan after World War II, its presence in
the region was extended due to the outbreak of the Korean War when communism threatened the
region. As a result, the United States allied with the ROC in order to establish itself as a
hegemonic state, and used this tool to deter the PRC and contain the CPC’s influence.
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The First Taiwan Strait Crisis: 1954-1955
A. Situation
The United States actively worked to contain communism in the Asia Pacific, and did so
by using tools, such as its hegemonic presence to deter PRC aggression against the ROC. The
three Taiwan Strait Crises are predominant examples of US extended deterrence of the PRC
through its protections of the ROC. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis is the initial occurrence of the
US policy of extended deterrence in the Cross Strait region.
The First Taiwan Strait Crisis started even as the Korean War began to subside. The
CPC intended to reunite the PRC and the ROC, while the KMT wanted to regain control of
Mainland China. This situation resulted in tensions over the strategically located Quemoy66 and
Matsu islands in the Taiwan Strait.67 Both islands are approximately 100 miles west of Taiwan.
After Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalists fled from mainland China to Taiwan, Chiang
established troops on these two islands. Once the United States removed the Seventh Fleet from
the Taiwan Strait in 1954, the KMT attempted to retake Mainland China by launching attacks
from these strategic locations. In response, the PRC began shelling these islands.68
B. US Response
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After the KMT fled to Taiwan, the United States did not attempt to protect it; however,
this situation soon changed due to the Korean War in 1950. The Korean War was the first
militarized Cold War conflict and began the containment of communism in the Asia Pacific
region. As a result of the war outbreak, the Truman administration sent the Seventh Fleet69 to
the Taiwan Strait to “preserve international peace and security.” Truman also stated,
“In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa (Taiwan) by Communist
forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United
States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.
Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on
Formosa.”70

This shift did not guarantee that the United States would use military force to defend the
ROC; however, it demonstrated US aggressive intentions and commitment of the United States
in defending the ROC from the PRC, and by extension, defending the Asia Pacific from the
spread of communism. As a result, the PRC delayed its attack on the ROC in favor of supporting
North Korea.
As the Korean War began to subside and after the Eisenhower administration began in
1953, the United States ended its naval blockade that protected the ROC. In 1954, the PRC
began attacks against Matsu and Quemoy in response to ROC aggression, and the United States
responded by forming the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which was created to unify the
region against communist influence, and began treaty talks with the ROC.71
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During the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, the United States did not re-deploy US fleets to the
Taiwan Strait. Instead, the United States signed the “Mutual Defense Treaty.” This treaty is a
bilateral security agreement that lasted until 197872 and guaranteed US-ROC cooperation against
communist powers in order to reduce communist influence in the Asia Pacific Region. Likewise,
the United States also signed the “Formosa Resolution”73 in 1955, which guaranteed US defense
of the ROC if a PRC attack threatened it.74 This legislation did not include the islands of
Quemoy and Matsu that the PRC had already begun attacking; however, as a result of this
resolution, the PRC stopped bombing the islands in 1955.75 Although the United States already
withdrew the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, it still intervened diplomatically in order to
deter PRC attacks and insure that the PRC did not defeat the ROC.
By agreeing to these initial protections of the ROC, the United States began its policy of
extended-deterrence in the Cross Strait region. As a result, even before the United States
formally recognized the PRC, it began containing CPC influence in the Asia Pacific. Without
US deterrence, the PRC could have defeated the ROC and expanded its influence at an early
stage. If this occurred, the United States might have not have established an extensive presence
in the Asia Pacific, and the PRC could have been the regional hegemon.
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The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis: 1958
A. Situation
In 1956 and 1957, the PRC and the ROC began to coexist in a non-violent environment;
however, this situation changed in 1958 due to two factors. First, the PRC considered the
increase in US-ROC relations to be a threat to PRC national security.76 Second, the PRC
chairman, Mao Tse-tung, launched the “Great Leap Forward”.77 The Great Leap Forward was
an initiative to fasten the PRC’s economic growth by transforming society and liberating the
island of Taiwan from the ROC.78
Due to the Great Leap Forward initiative, the PRC once more began shelling the islands
of Matsu and Quemoy in order to “liberate” the Chinese people on Taiwan from ROC rule. The
attack began with the PRC shelling Quemoy, which resulted in ROC retaliation by returning fire.
B. US Response
The United States took advantage of the increased tensions between the ROC and the
PRC in order to once more engage in extended deterrence of the PRC and contain communist
influence. While the United States refused to issue a public statement of intent to defend
Quemoy from the PRC, it did respond to these attacks by upholding its obligations in the “1954
Mutual Defense Treaty”. This treaty did not guarantee military support if Quemoy was attacked,
76

The US did not force the ROC to demilitarize Quemoy and Matsu and the US provided weapons to the ROC
This was an economic and social campaign by the CPC from 1958 to 1961. It was meant to use industrialization
and collectivization to rapidly transform the PRC into a socialist society. This campaign is considered to have failed
because it is considered to have caused the Great Chinese Famine, a widespread famine, which resulted in the deaths
of approximately 20 to 43 million Chinese.
78
“MILESTONES: 1953-1960”. US Department of State, Office of the Historian. Web.
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/taiwan-strait-crises
77

37

and the US government later stated that “the basic policy of the American government was that it
would help defend the Offshore Islands (Quemoy and Matsu) only if necessary for the defense of
Taiwan.”79 The Eisenhower administration responded by reinforcing naval vessels to protect
ROC supply lines and deter attacks against the island of Taiwan; however, the United States did
not actively participate in attacks against the PRC. The US government authorized the vessels to
“prepare to assist in the event of a major assault against Quemoy.”80 Although US policy
continued to work under a system of communist containment, the United States simply used its
policies and the threat of its superior military to deter the PRC from attacking the ROC. As a
result, the United States avoided conflict, while simultaneously containing communism in the
region.
The US presence and decision to defend the ROC indicated its desire to deter the PRC
from launching a large attack against the ROC; however, tensions continued and the PRC
announced “their claim to a twelve-mile limit, which would put all of the Offshore Islands within
their territorial waters.”81 Likewise, the Soviet government also warned the United States that an
attack against the PRC would be considered an attack against the Soviet Union and could result
in a third World War.82 The threat of the Soviet Union likely had an adverse effect on the United
States because, despite these warnings, the United States continued with its deterrence of the
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PRC through protections of supply lines to Quemoy and Matsu. Although the Soviet Union
disapproved of US actions, the United States continued defending the ROC. These actions
indicated the US desire to contain communism in the Asia Pacific.
Due to the resulting Cross Strait stalemate and desire not to combat the United States, the
PRC and ROC reached a ceasefire within a few months. The US military presence and support
of the ROC in the Second Taiwan Missile Crisis deterred the PRC and resulted in an end to the
conflict. The United States actively deterred the PRC from attacking the ROC, which contained
PRC influence over the Taiwan Strait. Without US deterrence, this conflict could have likely
escalated and led to fighting on either Mainland China or Taiwan, and resulted in a KMT or CPC
defeat. Likewise, this crisis further established the US status of a stabilizing hegemonic state in
the region.
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The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis: 1995-1996
A. Cornell and Increased Tensions
After the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, United States began its formal recognition of the
PRC, and continued security protections to the ROC. The gap in-between the first two Taiwan
Strait Crises and the third crisis indicate the success in the US extended deterrence of the PRC
through its security relationship with the ROC. After the first two Taiwan Strait Crises, the
United States utilized its influence as the hegemonic state in the region to maintain a stable
environment. By providing security protections to the ROC, specifically those highlighted in the
TRA and the “Six Assurances”, the United States achieved in dissuading the PRC from attacking
the ROC and prioritizing internal affairs rather than external ones. By the 1990s, the PRC began
to be discontent with US hegemony, and portrayed this through its aggressive actions against the
ROC.
It was not until Cross Strait tensions increased in 1995 that the United States used its
military to demonstrate its commitment to these agreements. The US reaction to the increased
tensions demonstrate the US containment policy of CPC influence. These tensions resulted in
the 1995-1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis and originated from an invitation that Cornell University
extended to Lee Teng-hui in 1995. Lee was the president of the ROC and the KMT Chairman
from 1988 until 2000, and is referred to as the “Father of the ROC Democracy”.
Although the US State Department initially refused to grant Lee a visa, the US House of
Representatives voted in unanimous favor of granting President Lee a visa to the United States,
and the Senate followed with an almost unanimous vote of its own (there was one dissenter).
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The Clinton administration claimed that a visit by Lee “would have serious consequences” and
that “a visit by a person his title, whether or not the visit were termed private, would be seen by
the PRC as removing an essential element of unofficially in the US-ROC relationship.” 83
Although the Clinton administration repeatedly stressed that it had not changed its stance on the
“One China” policy and despite the PRC government’s warnings, President Clinton finally
reversed the ban preventing high ranking ROC officials from visiting the United States and
granted Lee a visa.84
The PRC government promptly announced its response to the visa by claiming, “If the
United States clings to its erroneous decision it will inevitably cause severe damage to SinoAmerican relations. For that it should bear all the consequences.”85 After the United States
refused to revoke the visa, the PRC government claimed that the United States violated the “One
China” principle through acknowledgement of the ROC leader.
By giving the ROC president an US visa, both Sino-American and Cross Strait relations
were strained. Sino-American diplomatic visits were cancelled and the PRC recalled its US
ambassador. In regards to the ROC, the PRC suspended Cross Strait relations and began military
exercises in the Taiwan Strait to display its disapproval.86 In the 40 years since the Second
Taiwan Strait Crisis, there had been no conflict between the PRC and the ROC, and the PRC did
not force reunification with the ROC, which indicates the US success of acting as the regional
hegemon and stabilizing the area through deterring the PRC.

By the 1990s, Cross Strait

aggressions grew once more despite the US hegemonic presence, which indicates the PRC
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beginning to focus on external affairs rather than internal ones, and challenging the US presence
in the region.

B. The PLA Response
The PRC began missiles tests off of the coast of the ROC to display its disapproval of the
ROC’s and US actions, but the question remains, why was the PRC’s reaction so extreme? I
propose that the US presence in the Asia Pacific decreased in deterrence effect during the time
since the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, which resulted in an increase in PRC aggressions.
In 1995, the PLA began firing ballistic missiles from the Fujian province87 directed to
landing in the sea within 100 miles of Taipei, demonstrating an accuracy that was not previously
experienced with the PRC missiles.88 For the ROC, these missiles dramatically increased the
threat of the cost of war against the PRC.
Soon after the initial missiles tests, the PLA conducted another military exercise, which
involved missiles tests and deployment of the PLA Navy and Air Force.89 Likewise, the PLA
conducted additional tests at the end of 1995, including amphibious assault exercises on
Dongshan Island, which is south of Taiwan.90 The PLA conducted these tests to show that it was
prepared to attack the ROC if it moved towards independence.
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The crisis elevated even more in 1996 as the ROC elections approached, which were the
first democratic elections on the island. The increase in tensions was not only due to the threat
of ROC elections, but the opportunity to challenge the US hegemonic presence as well. In
response to these tests, President Lee claimed, “it (the PRC) is afraid of the ROC’s first
democratic presidential elections and the impact on the Chinese people.”91 On March 8, 1996,
the PLA launched three missiles — two of which hit waters close to the ROC’s largest port,
Kaohsiung, and one hit waters close to a Keelung, a port near Taipei.
In addition to these missiles tests, the PLA continued maritime and amphibious assault
exercises.92 Although the 1995 exercises did not stop the ROC from acting as an independent
state, the PLA conducted these in an attempt to deter the 1996 elections.
The reason that the PRC responded strongly to these events is explained by Kim when he
claims, “Dissatisfied great powers do not like to accept the status quo and want to challenge the
rules of the game mainly set up by the dominant power whenever they have enough power to
challenge.”93 Because the PRC made the decision to challenge the United States, the deterrent
effect of the US hegemon decreased, which resulted in destabilization of the region once more.
Although the United States did not become less of a credible threat, the PRC’s extreme reaction
could be attributed to its dissatisfaction with the dominant power, the United States, and the
perception of an opportunity to challenge the hegemon.
C. The US Response
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The militaristic reaction of the United States after the end of the Cold War indicates the
US continued desire to contain PRC influence, and this desire evolved to maintain the US
hegemonic presence. As previously stated, the regional hegemons go to great lengths to stop
other great powers from expanding their influence.

Likewise, the United States used its

relationship with the ROC to deter the expansion of PRC power and contain its growth.
In 1996, the Clinton administration reacted in order to counteract the PRC threats to the
ROC and attempts to deter US support of the ROC by ordering US naval vessels into the Taiwan
Strait. The United States did not tolerate PRC aggression towards the ROC, and the US Defense
Secretary William J. Perry indicted this when he stated, “Beijing should know, and this (the US
fleet) will remind them, that while they are a great military power, the strongest, the premier
military power in the Western Pacific is the United States.”94 Although the PRC attempted to
challenge US involvement in this region through a display of force, the United States countered
this through an even stronger display. Although the Cold War with the Soviet Union had ended,
the United States still acted to contain the influence of the PRC.
In March 1996, the Clinton administration ordered two aircraft carriers and strike groups
into the Taiwan Strait in response to PRC aggression. The U.S.S. Independence95 and its strike
group were quickly redirected to the ROC. In addition to the supercarrier,96 the strike team

94

Pine, Art. “U.S. Faces Choice on Sending Ships to Taiwan Strait; Military: Washington would like to see tensions
abate. But continued pressure by China could force it to act.” Los Angeles Times, March 20, 1996.
http://www.proquest.com/
95
The U.S.S. Independence is a Forrestal-class aircraft carrier (the first type of supercarrier)
96
The largest type of aircraft carrier

44

consisted of a guided missile cruiser,97 two destroyers,98 two submarines, one replenishment
ship, and over 70 aircraft.99
The Clinton administration also redirected the U.S.S. Nimitz from the Mediterranean and
led another strike group of five naval vessels into the Taiwan Strait.100 This strike group
consisted of a guided missile cruiser, two destroyers, one submarine, two replenishment ships,
and over 100 aircraft.

This was the largest fleet assembled in the Asia Pacific region in

decades.101
The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis shows that the US deterrent to the PRC diminished due to
PRC discontent with the US hegemonic presence, and a desire to test the extent that the United
States would protect the ROC. The PRC wants to reunite with the ROC, and by default, opposes
ROC elections and potential ROC declarations of independence. Without US interference, the
PRC would have carried out attacks against the ROC, disrupted the elections, and possibly
forced reunification upon the island. By assembling the largest fleet in the Asia Pacific region
and deterring PRC aggression, the United States achieved in pursuing its own objectives in the
region, such as maintaining influence, supporting the ROC democracy, continuing arms sales,
and protecting Asian Pacific allies.
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Chapter Four

Future Hypothesis: US and PRC Goals in the Asia Pacific
I assess that the PRC likely desires to become the Asia Pacific hegemon in the future, but
cannot due so while the United States retains its influence over the region. This section will
discuss how the United States maintains a presence in the Asia Pacific, deters current PRC
influence, and the progress of PLA development. Because this section concerns future scenarios,
these theories cannot be tested, but are still important to take into account for future research
because it concerns stability in the Asia Pacific.
ROC Democracy: US Support despite PRC Disapproval
A. The ROC’s Democratic System and the PRC
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has continued to remain influential in
the Asia Pacific region, specifically in regards to the Cross Strait situation. How does the United
States justify continuing the security relationship with the ROC? One of the primary reasons that
validate the US presence in the region is the support of the ROC democratic system. By
maintaining support for the ROC democracy, the United States rationalizes its continued
presence in the region. Likewise, as the ROC’s democratic system developed, so have more
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anti-reunification sentiment and the desire of the populace to maintain a government independent
of the PRC.
The ROC’s KMT and DPP have different platforms on the Cross Strait issue. The KMT
supports the “One China” policy of 1992, and believes that China is one country with two
political systems — the respective governments of the PRC and the ROC. As a result, the KMT
supports maintaining a relationship with the PRC in order to uphold the idea that the ROC is an
inalienable part of China.

In opposition to this ideology, the DPP advocates for ROC

independence and wants it to become a state independent of the PRC.
Bush’s political analysis of the ROC’s two party system and the effect on the ROC’s
security addresses the DPP-KMT rivalry, specifically how politics in the PRC and the ROC
aggravated tensions in the Taiwan Strait. According to Bush, the primary concern of the PRC is
that the ROC will move away from unification and towards independence, while the ROC fears
that the PRC will constrain it and force it to conform to the PRC’s wishes. As a result, both sides
reacted in order to protect their individual interests. The PRC began building up its military
capabilities in order to dissuade ROC independence, and the ROC fought to expand its
international space by pushing to join international organizations.
Blanchard and Vranken address Cross Strait tensions in regard to domestic political
variables, which indicate that tensions increased from 2000 to 2008 while a pro-separation DPP
president was in office;102 however, in 2008, the ROC populace elected the previous KMT
president, Ma Ying-jiu,103 for president. During the Ma administration, diplomatic relations
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between the ROC and the PRC improved due to increased communications and cooperation.104
For example, in November 2015, Ma Ying-jiu and the PRC leader Xi Jin-ping met, which was
the first encounter between high ranking PRC and ROC officials since the Chinese Civil War.
Despite the increased political dialogue between the two regions, the PLA continues to develop
and deploy assets opposite of the ROC in order to deter its independence. Bush points out that
although the PRC has not increased the number of short-range ballistic missiles, the PLA still
increases cruise missiles. Likewise, the ballistic missiles are being developed to cause more
damage to the ROC, which Bush considers to be more important than the quantity of missiles
developed.105
B. US Support: Deterrence through ROC Democratic Support
Despite the fluctuations in the relations between the PRC and the ROC, the United States
continues to maintain its support for the ROC democratic system; however, it does so within the
bounds of the “One China” policy. Why would the United States risk this support of a small
island if it upsets the PRC and results in PLA actions? I assess this results from the desire to
continue the US extended-deterrence policy towards the PRC. By supporting the ROC and its
power transitions, the United States continues to insure that the PRC does not expand its power,
that the ROC’s democratic system remains, and that the United States maintains its influential
presence in the region.
Although one of primary reasons that the United States continues support for the ROC is
because of desire to preserve the ROC democracy, the United States could also use the
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preservation of the ROC democracy to prevent the PRC from expanding its influence, and by
extension, maintaining the US presence in the region. By emphasizing its desire to protect the
ROC democracy, the United States appears to have an increased interest and stake in the Asia
Pacific. As a result, the United States can justify its Asia Pacific presence and continued
recognition of the TRA.
In addition to this, another reason for the United States maintaining its relationship with
the ROC is due to its symbolic value. By supporting the ROC’s existence, the United States
demonstrates its continued ability to thwart PRC’s actions. As a result, the United States shows
that it still has an influential presence in the Asia Pacific and can manipulate the PRC on an issue
of historical, political and cultural importance, and geographic proximity.
The United States utilized the development of the ROC democratic system and applied it
to its extended-deterrence of the PRC, a strategy described by Chan when he states, “People, and
by extension states, act strategically. They adjust their behavior given their understanding of
others’ motives and in anticipation of others’ reactions to their behavior.”106 Likewise, the
United States appropriately adjusted its reasons for continuing support to the ROC, such as
maintaining the status quo — the ROC’s democracy.
The reason that the United States prioritized maintaining an alliance with the ROC is
likely due to asymmetric stakes. Because states directly involved in the region, such as the PRC,
tend to have a higher stake in the dispute, they will be more passionate than extended actors,
such as the United States, about the dispute. As a result, the PRC could think that its goals in
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relation to the ROC could be more important that US goals. Chan portrays this idea when he
claims,
“The PRC has an easier, prima facie case to show that it has an intrinsic stake in
the ROC’s status. In contrast, the United States has to try harder to demonstrate
that it feels equally strongly about the ROC and that its professed stake in this
island’s fate is not extrinsic to, or derivative of, other, more important goals.
There is a difference between fighting for one’s homeland (or professed homeland) and fighting for an ally or protégé́ .” 107

There is an indisputable need to have an objective for acting as an extended-deterrent. I
assess that the United States emphasizes the importance of the support of the ROC’s democratic
system as a reason for maintaining support to the ROC.

Although the United States undeniably

supports the ROC democratic system, which was portrayed through Congress’ support for the
invitation to Cornell, this support is also used to maintain a presence in the region. Because the
ROC’s democratic system is now part of the of the Asia Pacific status quo, the United States
justifies its actions through its desire to maintain this status quo.

PLA Development: A Response to US Involvement
I argue that the United States continues to engage in extended-deterrence of the PRC
through arms sales, which assist the ROC in maintaining an armed forces that will not be easily
compelled by a far superior PLA. Likewise, the United States utilizes arms sales to maintain a
military relationship with the ROC and continues to deter the PRC from forcing reunification
upon the ROC.
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On one hand, arms sales deter Cross Strait reunification; however, on the other hand,
arms sales also encourage the PRC’s increased development of the PLA. Shambaugh claims that
the reason for the development of the PLA and its military technologies results from the PRC
preparing for potential future conflict with the ROC and the United States over Taiwan
sovereignty.108 By modernizing its weapons systems and military, the PRC prepares to combat
the United States if necessary and also dissuades the ROC from attempting to obtain sovereignty.
Due to US extended deterrence, the PRC strategically invested into PLA development in
case conflict with the United States and Taiwan proves to be inevitable. Blasko describes this
development when he says that the PLA has focused on technological development and longterm modernization programs, such as missile development.109 This focus on military equipment
and weapons displays the PLA’s intent on reunification.110
In addition to military development, the PRC’s “2005 Anti-Secession Law” states that the
PRC would use force against the ROC if it declared independence from the PRC.111 Likewise,
the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China 2007” details the PRC’s strategy in regards to the PLA in regards to potential
conflict in the Taiwan Strait.112 As can be indicated from this report, the PRC considers US
protection of the ROC to be a potential threat to the PRC. Likewise, I assess that PLA growth
discourages the United States from abandoning the ROC, rather than having the contrary effect.
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The United States maintains its relationship with the ROC despite the threat and growth of the
PLA in order to maintain the status quo in the Asia Pacific.
The United States continues arms sales to the ROC and has increased sales in recent
years, a situation that could be a result of the PRC’s vigorous PLA development. Likewise, the
United States ignores demands by the PRC to end arms sales. For example, in 2011 and 2015,
the PRC threatened sanctions against the United States due to an increase in arms sales to the
ROC; however, the United States went through with the sales. Likewise, on December 16, 2015,
the Obama administration announced a deal to sell $1.83 billion worth of arms to the ROC
armed forces.113 In response, the PRC’s foreign ministry has shown its disapproval for these
sales and warned the United States that it will hurt Sino-American relations. Despite these
warnings from the PRC, the United States once more refused to end arms sales to the ROC.
The ROC is not the only territorial issue that the United States uses to deter the PRC. In
recent years, the PRC has constructed artificial islands that are in the proximity of the Spratly
islands. The Spratly islands have been the subject of territorial dispute between the PRC, Brunei,
the Philippines, the ROC, and Vietnam.114 In response to the development of these artificial
structures, in 2015, the US Navy conducted a navigation operation within 6-7 nautical miles of
these structures.115 The United States does not support the PRC’s land reclamation in the South
China Sea and still strives to contain PRC growth. The evolution of the ROC’s government into
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a democracy exacerbated Cross Strait tensions, and motivates the continuance of the US-ROC
relationship.
The United States continues to participate in extended deterrence of the PRC through
arms sales to the ROC, which, in addition to supporting the ROC democratic system, assists the
United States in maintaining its influential presence in the region. By continuing arms sales to
the ROC, the United States ensures that PLA capabilities cannot compel the ROC to negotiate
about reunification.
The PRC has incentives to attack the ROC, such as expanding its influence and
reinforcing CPC legitimacy over the Chinese region; however, the United States presence in the
region dissuades this reunification from occurring. A conflict against the superior US military
would likely harm the PRC more than reunification with the ROC would benefit it. As a result,
the PLA’s development indicates the PRC’s acknowledgement of this threat, while
simultaneously encouraging the United States to maintain its protections of the ROC.
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Chapter Five

Conclusion
The idea for this thesis originated from the notion that the ROC had strategic value to the
United States. This idea resulted in the formulation of the question of “Why would the United
States maintain its relationship with the ROC despite the threat of the PRC?” The initial
hypothesis for this question was that the United States continued its relationship with the ROC in
order to contain communist influence in the region. This hypothesis was tested through the
analysis of existing literature and theoretical models, which support this hypothesis.
During the period between the Second and Third Taiwan Strait Crises, the United States
acted as the hegemonic state in the Asia Pacific region. As a result, the United States utilized its
influence to create a stabile Cross Strait region and deter PRC aggression. Since the Chinese
Civil War, whenever the PRC threatened the ROC’s sovereignty through force, the United States
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stepped in to intervene on the ROC’s behalf. The most prominent examples of US deterrence to
the PRC are the three Taiwan Strait Crises, in which United States directly prevented the PRC
from attacking the ROC and forcing reunification between the two regions. During the 1990s,
the PRC became discontent with the US influence in the region and challenged that authority,
resulting in the third crisis.
Since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, the PRC has continued to challenge US authority in
the region and likely has a desire to become the Asia Pacific hegemony. Despite this, according
to Hegemonic Stability Theory, the PRC will be unable to become the regional hegemon as long
as the US has a strong presence in the region. As a result, the PRC discourages US involvement
with Taiwan. If the PRC did succeed in becoming the regional hegemon, it would likely attempt
to expel US influence from this region so as to not be threatened by the US military presence,
while simultaneously expanding its own influence.
In order to contain the threat of a PRC hegemon, the United States continues to deter the
PRC through its security relationship with the ROC, which insures that the United States remains
an influential presence in the region. Because the United States has superior military
capabilities, the PRC hesitates in taking actions against the ROC due to fear of US retaliation.
The United States utilizes the relationship with Taiwan to emphasize its value of the
Cross Strait situation. If a conflict has asymmetric stakes for the participants, the actor with the
higher stake could believe that its goals are more important. There is a need to have an objective
for participating in Cross Strait tensions and serving as an extended-deterrent. As a result, the
United States claims its support of the ROC democracy as reasoning for maintaining this
relationship with Taiwan.
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The United States also continues to partake in extended deterrence through arms sales to
the ROC. Despite threats of the PRC and claims that US-ROC arms sales disrupt Sino-American
relations, the United States continues these sales which decrease the threat of the PRC to the
ROC. Likewise, the United States legitimizes its actions through its agreements with the ROC,
such as the TRA and the “Six Assurances”.
What are the implications for the future of the PRC-ROC relationship for US national
security? Because the ROC recently elected a pro-independence president, one should consider
the possibility of the ROC declaring its independence from the PRC. Likewise, one must take
into account that the PRC could attack the ROC unprovoked to force unification on the between
the regions.

If a Cross Strait conflict occurred, which side would the United States support?

Would the United States uphold the TRA promise of protections to the ROC if the PRC attacked
before the ROC declared independence? If the ROC did declare independence and the PRC
retaliated, would the United States standby and allow for the expansion of PRC influence? I
recommend that the United States continue its ambiguous policies towards the situation by not
directly supporting ROC independence. The United States benefits as much from the current
status quo as it would from an independent ROC. As a result, the United States should not
support a ROC declaration of formal independence, which would increase tensions and
potentially harm Sino-American relations.
If a Cross Strait conflict erupted, US security interests would be impacted due to the
importance of remaining a presence in the region. This thesis established that the United States
values its relationship with the ROC and uses this relationship to contain the PRC. The only
question left to answer is: To what extent will the United States maintain this relationship in the
future?
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